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Abstract 
 
Three decades of financial crises culminating in the Global Financial Crisis have 
prompted the development of multi-layered global financial governance. In this article, 
we examine the relationship between the global and regional layers by analysing the 
case of the global and ASEAN+3 financial safety nets. Making use of regime theory, 
we examine the evolution of the characteristics, main institutions, goals and 
behavioural expectations of these two nets. In this article we argue that the ASEAN+3 
regional financial safety net, which was mostly developed following the East Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997, complements rather than undermines the global financial 
safety net. Similar characteristics, goals and behavioural expectations underpin this 
complementarity. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and previous crises in East Asia, several Latin 
American countries or Russia, among others, underline the importance of developing 
solid, multilateral financial safety nets to pre-empt recurrence in the future.
2
 
Nonetheless, there is no agreement regarding the optimal geographical scope of these 
safety nets. Options include a global financial safety net (GFSN), a multitude of 
regional financial safety nets (RFSN), domestic safety nets or a combination of them. 
This is a relevant issue insofar contemporary financial flows have become globalised, 
yet the failure of the GFSN to prevent or swiftly solve the GFC and previous crises 
raises doubts regarding the effectiveness or even adequacy of a single GFSN. 
 
The case of the ASEAN+3 RFSN is particularly useful to explore the relationship 
between regional and global safety nets. Prior to the GFC, the East Asian Financial 
Crisis (EAFC) of 1997 was regarded as the most damaging in decades in terms of its 
impact both on the economy of the affected countries and beyond them. As a result of 
the EAFC, several countries in the region started to develop financial safety nets to 
Manuscript
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prevent and manage future crises. These countries grouped themselves under a RFSN: 
ASEAN+3. Following the GFC, existing institutions have been upgraded and new 
ones have been launched. 
 
An ASEAN+3-specific related net, however, did not emerge in a vacuum. Global and 
pan-Asian institutions are also in place. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) were already 
involved in financial governance well before the EAFC. At the pan-Asian level, the 
Executives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) had been running 
for a few years when the EAFC struck. Several East Asian countries – most notably 
Japan – were already members of these institutions. This suggests recognition by 
government officials that an effective financial safety net, to the extent that it can be 
achieved, requires multilateral cooperation at the global level. 
 
Furthermore, the EAFC compelled countries in the region to develop domestic safety 
nets. These were divided into two forms of self-insurance: central bank reserves and 
bilateral arrangements – mainly central bank currency swap agreements. Thus, China, 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand, in this order, are 
among the top 15 countries by foreign-exchange reserves as of 2014. Meanwhile, 
central banks in the region – led by the People’s Bank of China – have signed a 
plethora of currency swap agreements. Even though domestic safety nets, by 
definition, are designed to only enhance the stability of the country developing them, 
their simultaneous adoption by most countries in a particular region supports RFSNs. 
Space constraints, however, prevents us from exploring the interaction between 
domestic safety nets on the one hand and RFSNs and the GFSN on the other. 
 
The RFSN centred around ASEAN+3 is therefore part of a wider institutional 
framework with global, regional, and domestic layers. In common with the extant 
regional net in the Eurozone, the ASEAN+3 institutional framework belongs to a 
network of arrangements linked to each other. This safety net is especially interesting 
insofar ASEAN+3 lacks the legal and political framework which underpins financial 
governance in the EU. Concurrently, ASEAN+3 is arguably more integrated in other 
safety layers than the Eurozone. This is especially the case with regards to domestic 
arrangements. 
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The sophistication of the ASEAN+3 RFSN raises one important question: how does 
the ASEAN+3 financial safety net interact with the GFSN? The global framework 
centred around the BCBS and the IMF, regional institutions, and domestic 
arrangements simultaneously boost and potentially undermine the ASEAN+3 safety 
net. The relationship between all of them serves to determine the role of a well-
developed regional layer in the GFSN. 
 
In this article, we prove that RFSNs complement rather than replace the GFSN. 
Building on regime theory literature, we will analyse how the shortcomings of the 
GFSN explain the creation of RFSNs, leading to certain institutional characteristics 
that underpin their complementarity with the GFSN itself. A detailed case study of 
East Asia’s RFSN – ASEAN+3 – will be used to guide our investigation of the extent 
to which they complement the GFSN. 
 
The article will be organised as follows. Firstly, we will explain the main aspects of a 
regime theory approach. Afterwards, we will analyse the GFSN by looking at its 
different layers, characteristics and main goals. Subsequently, we will analyse the 
ASEAN+3 regional layer in detail, focusing on its evolution and how it explains its 
complementarity with the GFSN. Finally, a concluding section will summarise our 
argument. 
 
2. Regime Theory 
 
Several scholars have advanced different definitions of regime. The most oft-used is 
Krasner’s, who considers regimes as “principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”3 This 
definition is similar to that advanced by Keohane and Nye, who describe regimes as 
“sets of governing arrangements affecting relationships of interdependence” that 
“may be affected by networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularise 
behaviour and control its effects.”4 Krasner’s definition is also similar to Young’s, 
who talks about “specialised arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, 
resources, or geographical areas.”5 
 
 4 
These definitions point out at three characteristics of international regimes. Firstly, 
regimes are created around a particular issue or area. This might be narrowly or 
broadly defined, but it has to be clear to participants in the regime. Otherwise, the 
regime will be ineffective insofar participating actors will be unable to ascertain the 
object of the regime. Secondly, regimes have goals. These relate to the particular issue 
or area around which a regime is built, and give a purpose to the regime itself. Thus, 
participants in the regime understand what they should strive to achieve. Finally, 
regimes create expectations of behaviour. In order to attain the goals of a particular 
regime, participants have to act according to certain patterns of codified and non-
codified conduct. This way, participants in a regime can predict the actions of their 
peers. 
 
Why are regimes constructed? Drawing from functionalist approaches to international 
regimes, Keohane argues that regimes are created when the anticipated (positive) 
effects of a regime outweigh the benefits of not having the regime.
6
 States will hold 
the belief that regimes are superior to ad-hoc agreements if three conditions are met: 
legal liability, which refers to the organisation of relationships in mutually beneficial 
ways; a rearrangement of transaction costs, making non-compliance with the regime 
more costly than compliance; and a reduction in uncertainty as a result of the 
provision of reliable information.
7
 
 
Haggard and Simmons indicate that regime theories based on functionalism do not 
particularly excel at explaining causality.
8
 Nevertheless, Keohane’s analysis of the 
conditions under which regimes are constructed carries explanatory power. The three 
conditions listed by Keohane double as the effects of well-functioning regimes. They 
amount to reciprocity, which is the cornerstone of international regimes and the main 
reason behind cooperation.
9
 
 
As Axelrod explains, stable reciprocity among very few actors is sufficient for 
cooperation to begin. Cooperation can then expand to other issues and include more 
actors. Similarly, international regimes can be constructed by very few states seeking 
the effects of legal liability, transaction costs rearrangement, and reliable information 
provision. If these effects are achieved, regimes endure in time and might even 
expand to cover new issues and accommodate more states.
10
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It should be noted, however, that regimes are not static. They evolve over time, in at 
least four ways: strength, organisational form, scope, and allocation mode. Strength 
refers to the degree of compliance with the regime; organisational form makes 
reference to its design and operation, whether institutionalised or not; scope alludes to 
the range of issues covered by a regime; and allocation mode refers to the different 
social mechanisms to allocate resources.
11
 
 
Change in an international regime can occur for different reasons, according to the 
theoretical approach that one takes. Following from the functionalism underpinning 
our approach to regimes, it would be argued that evolution or complete change take 
place when a regime becomes dysfunctional.
12
 Drawing an analogy with domestic 
politics, regimes evolve when they do not perform properly, leading to the creation of 
new regimes that at least have the potential to work well.
13
 Inability to solve a crisis, a 
realignment of interests or the presence of a free rider are some of the reasons which 
can make a regime dysfunctional. When this happens, regimes tend to metamorphose 
rather than disappear. 
 
Adopting a functionalist approach to international regimes is not without its 
challenges. As Strange has argued, a significant risk associated to this approach stems 
from its state-centredness, which results on a focus on the positive aspects of 
regimes.
14
 Meanwhile, Onuf has pointed out that the construction of regimes is a goal 
in and by itself. He believes that this is often neglected in the study or international 
regimes.
15
 More fundamentally, Kratochwil and Ruggie have argued that this 
approach to the study of international regimes too easily assumes that goals can be 
distinguished from means. However, this distinction is not always clear.
16
 These 
challenges could potentially render a functionalist study or international regime 
obsolete. 
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, a functionalist approach to international regimes 
retains its explanatory power. This approach calls our attention to the potential for 
regimes to enhance cooperation among states. Cooperation will result from the 
benefits of a regime outweighing the benefits of its non-existence. Keohane lays out 
the three main conditions why regimes appeal to states, as described above. Thus, a 
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functionalist approach serves to understand the benefits that states seek to obtain from 
a regime, along with the concomitant behavioural expectations that should ensure 
achievement of those benefits – regardless of these benefits being actually achieved. 
In short, a functionalist approach to regime theory serves to explain the emergence 
and evolution of a regime in terms of a convergence in interests that leads to goals and 
behavioural expectations to be articulated in a particular way. Recent examples of a 
functionalist approach to international regimes underpinning explanations of this 
convergence include scholarship on climate change,
17
 economic governance,
18
 
environmental governance,
19
 and inter-state peace.
20
 
 
In the following section, we will examine the GFSN from the perspective of an 
evolving regime. The GFSN has suffered significant changes since its inception in the 
aftermath of World War II. Even though the overarching goal – financial safety – has 
remained constant, the meaning of this goal itself and behavioural expectations have 
changed overtime. A regime theory approach allows us to explain this evolution 
through the prism of changes in the form and characteristics of the GFSN. 
 
3. Evolution of the Global Financial Safety Net as a Regime 
 
The modern GFSN regime is characterised by its multi-layered, institutionalised, and 
bureaucratised nature. The first characteristic refers to the division of the regime into 
interlinked global, regional, and domestic safety nets. Institutionalisation makes 
reference to the existence of a number of institutions involved in the development and 
management of the regime; these include the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
the BCBS or the Financial Stability Board (FSB), among others. Finally, the GFSN is 
bureaucratised insofar financial institution and government bureaucrats with expert 
knowledge are key drivers behind the design, implementation and monitoring of the 
regime. This does not neglect the existence of a process of bargaining among national 
politicians in the GFSN – which we will touch upon in this article even though it is 
not our focus; instead, it highlights the discretion and leverage that bureaucrats with 
the necessary technical expertise have once general goals have been agreed. How and 
why did the GFSN morphed into its present form? 
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The modern financial safety regime first started to develop with the launch of the IMF 
in 1944. Until the 1970s, the GFSN would be relatively simple. Essentially, it was 
made up of a global layer only, with the IMF as the main institution involved in the 
regime. The principal goal of the GFSN was crisis management, while the 
behavioural expectation was the acceptance by stressed sovereigns of liquidity 
provided by the IMF. This explains the central role of this institution in the regime. 
Almost since its inception, one of the functions of the IMF was the provision of 
liquidity to states experiencing balance of payments difficulties.
21
 This was essential 
to maintain the Bretton Woods system in place from 1944 onwards. 
 
In the 1960s, the BIS provided limited support to states whose currencies were 
suffering exchange rate convertibility problems, such as France and the UK.
22
 
Nevertheless, financial repression until the 1970s in the form of limitations to cross-
border investment flows greatly reduced the number of financial crises. Most notably, 
banking crises were almost non-existent from the 1950s to the 1970s.
23
 Most states 
had restrictions on transnational flows, leading to stable financial markets. As a result, 
the role of the BIS in the GFSN was limited compared to the IMF’s. 
 
Financial liberalisation and the need for crisis prevention 
 
The end of the Bretton Woods System in 1971 and the progressive liberalisation of 
capital accounts across the world led to the development of a substantially different 
financial system. One of the main characteristics of this new system is 
interdependence.
24
 Portfolio investment flows have steadily grown and diversified as 
a result of financial interdependence. This has increased financial instability, as 
proved by recurrent banking and currency crises from the 1980s onwards.
25
 Given the 
depth and width of inter-state financial links, crises in one country or region now 
affect other countries as well. Thus, a different GFSN from the one established post-
1944 was needed. Policy-makers quickly grasped this – especially following foreign 
exchange-related problems afflicting banks in Germany and the US – and the current 
GFSN regime started to be developed in the early 1980s. 
 
Throughout this period, the regime continued to be composed by one layer only. The 
GFSN was discussed and agreed upon at the global level. Nevertheless, there were 
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two key differences with the pre-1980s period. Firstly, the BIS became the dominant 
institution in the regime. More specifically, the BCBS took the leading role in 
developing a GFSN regime. Secondly, the regime started to be codified through 
implementation of the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy (Basel I). 
 
Based at the BIS, the BCBS was set up in 1974 by the central bank governors of the 
G10 countries.
26
 Entrusted to develop common supervisory standards and to 
recommend best practice,
27
 by the 1980s it had become the central institution in the 
GFSN. Bringing together central monetary authority governors and other government 
bureaucrats with first-hand expertise of financial markets, the BCBS was relatively 
free from inter-state politics compared to other international institutions. 
Notwithstanding the relatively limited role of politics in shaping the work of the 
BCBS, the US and the UK did seek to enhance the competitiveness of their banking 
sectors while imposing costs on Japanese and German banks.
28
 
 
The BCBS thus agreed on Basel I, released in 1988. This accord was a response to the 
effects on international banks of the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s. There 
was a realisation that international banks were poorly prepared to operate in an 
increasingly volatile international environment.
29
 American banks were the most 
affected by the crisis, leading the US government to press for the creation of this 
accord.
30
 Basel I established a new goal: crisis prevention. The accord introduced 
minimum capital requirements for international banks operating across borders. These 
minimum capital requirements would allow banks to withstand possible losses related 
to their international operations.
31
 This way, a crisis in one country would not spread 
to that country’s own international banks or to other countries through their respective 
international banks. 
 
The crisis prevention goal led to the behavioural expectation of development of 
standards and codes. These were the remit of the BCBS.
32
 First codified in Basel I, 
they were under frequent discussion and review in order to better reflect the evolution 
of the global financial system. Therefore, amendments were introduced during the 
1990s to reflect the risks associated with the creation or increase in popularity of 
different financial products – such as derivatives – or to update banks’ internal risk 
models, for example.
33
 Even though the G7/8 was an important political force behind 
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the move to develop standards and codes, these were discussed and agreed by the 
BCBS.
34
 Crisis management remained as a second goal of the GFSN, still under the 
auspices of the IMF. Basel I was designed both to prevent the spread of a financial 
crisis to a country’s own international banks and to avoid the spread of the crisis to 
other countries. Nevertheless, there is evidence that crises recur in increasingly open 
financial systems.
35
 Thus, the behavioural expectation of distressed sovereigns 
accepting bailout packages from the IMF to overcome short-term liquidity difficulties 
remained unchanged. Due to the belief that developing and emerging countries with 
less sophisticated financial markets suffer from a so-called ‘emerging market risk’,36 
they would still need help in managing crises as they opened up. 
 
The development of a multi-layered GFSN regime 
 
Throughout the 1990s, financial crises affected countries and regions as diverse as 
East Asia, Finland, Latin America, Russia or Sweden. Some of these crises were the 
result of external factors – such as a rapid withdrawal of portfolio investment – while 
others were linked to domestic factors – for example, the sudden collapse of a housing 
bubble. Many of these crises spread beyond the country or region of origin, affecting 
international banks exposed to the financial sectors of other countries. The fact that 
states and regions at different stages of development and geographically far away 
suffered from financial crises, together with controversies regarding the role that the 
IMF played in several of them, led to substantial changes in the GFSN regime. 
 
To begin with, and most notably, the GFSN regime became multilayered, 
incorporating new institutions and countries. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a 
global layer still centred around the BCBS and, to an extent, the IMF grew with the 
launch of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999. Meanwhile, regional 
institutions were created in ASEAN+3 or the Eurozone. Concurrently, a domestic 
layer based upon central bank reserve accumulation also appeared. 
 
The goals of the regime also increased. Financial market strengthening was 
introduced as a third objective to be achieved as part of the GFSN. This was done at 
the regional level. An example was East Asia, where the Asian Bond Market Initiative 
(ABMI) was launched to create a strong local currency denominated bond market.
37
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Meanwhile, EU-level financial market regulation harmonization discussions became 
more common in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Financial Services Action Plan 
endorsed by the European Council in 2000 was a turning point in this respect.
38
 The 
objective was to create a stronger financial sector across the region through the 
creation of an integrated market. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, crisis prevention and crisis management remained as the 
two key objectives of the GFSN regime. With regards to the former, an expanded 
BCBS introduced Basel II in 2004. This accord implemented higher capital adequacy 
requirements for international banks.
39
 The behavioural expectation that standards and 
codes reflecting developments in the international financial system would be 
introduced was therefore kept. Differently from the previous accord, Basel II was not 
the result of US pressure mainly, but instead was negotiated as a result of 
disagreements between Washington and several European governments – most 
notably, Berlin.
40
 
 
During the 1990s and up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a second behavioural 
expectation related to crisis prevention was introduced. This was monitoring of 
implementation and information sharing. National authorities together with the IMF, 
the World Bank and bilateral financial safety nets (BFSN) were the initial drivers 
behind this expectation. Thus, the IMF and the World Bank jointly prepared Financial 
Sector Assessment Programmes and Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes.
41
 These new instruments suggest that national authorities became more 
actively involved in the GFSN regime, both through government-led institutions and 
through the implementation of agreed initiatives. 
 
A third behavioural expectation related to crisis prevention also introduced during this 
period was oversight and coordination. The FSF was responsible for fulfilling this 
expectation. It included finance ministries’ officials, central bank governors, and 
international financial institutions’ staff. 42  This further compounded the 
bureaucratised nature of the GFSN regime, since oversight and coordination were 
centralised in an institution host to experts with technical knowledge about financial 
markets. In common with the BCSB, the FSF was also managed by the BIS, which 
thus became an umbrella organisation for the GFSN regime. 
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Crisis management, meanwhile, ceased to be the remit of the IMF only. In ASEAN+3, 
the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was launched in 2000. Intended to supplement IMF 
funds, the CMI stemmed from the realisation that financial crisis could become 
regional, as had been the case with the EAFC.
43
 Concurrently, self-insurance in the 
form of central bank reserve accumulation and bilateral swap agreements also became 
common, including in East Asia.
44
 Capital accumulation and swap agreements were 
also the result of a trend towards reducing possible dependence on IMF bailout 
packages in periods of distress. 
 
Increasing complexity of the GFSN regime post-Global Financial Crisis 
 
The GFC showed the shortcomings of an arguably dysfunctional GFSN regime. 
Prevention mechanisms did not avert the crisis. Crisis management institutions could 
not swiftly put an end to it. Meanwhile, the strength of developed country financial 
markets was put into question, since the crisis originated and lasted longer in the US 
and the EU. After proving inadequate, politicians, policy-makers, experts, and even 
the private sector launched a process to create a more robust GFSN regime that, 
building on existing goals and institutions, would serve to avoid a repetition of the 
2007-08 crisis. 
 
Spurred by the GFC, the GFSN regime became truly multilayered. The BIS increased 
its membership,
45
 becoming less Western-centric through the incorporation of more 
monetary authorities from emerging and developing countries. The FSF was upgraded 
and rebranded as the FSB in 2009,
46
 further enhancing the role of states outside of 
North America and the EU. Meanwhile, the role of BFSNs, the IMF and the World 
Bank in the GFSN regime was boosted.
47
 
 
Concurrently, the regional and domestic layers grew in relevance. In ASEAN+3, the 
CMI was multilateralised and saw its financial resources increased in 2009. It was 
rebranded as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM).
48
 A new 
monitoring institution, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), was 
launched in 2011.
49
 In the Eurozone, two temporary financial assistance mechanisms 
created to deal with the Eurozone Debt Crisis – the European Financial Stability 
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Facility and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism – eventually morphed 
into a permanent institution in 2012 – the European Stability Mechanism (ESB).50 
Meanwhile, countries across the world strengthened self-insurance mechanisms – 
bilateral swap agreements and reserve accumulation – that proved useful to limit the 
impact of the GFC. 
 
The importance of crisis prevention as the main goal of the GFSN regime increased 
due to the devastating effects of the GFC. Basel II had not been fully implemented 
when the crisis struck. It would be replaced by Basel III in 2013. The new accord set 
even higher capital adequacy requirements for international banks, while also 
introducing leverage and liquidity rations to further strengthen their balance sheets.
51
 
Basel III was negotiated much more rapidly than the two preceding accords,
52
 
underscoring the reduced impact of inter-state politics in the further development of 
the GFSN. 
 
In addition, discussions about tightening regulation and potentially introducing higher 
capital adequacy requirements for “global systematically important financial 
institutions” were also launched. 53  These financial institutions were insurance 
companies. For the first time, large institutions involved in financial markets other 
than international banks were due to become regulated in order to prevent future 
crises. This enhanced the role of the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, which plays a similar role in the area of insurance to the BCBS’ in 
banking. 
 
The FSF/FSB became more active. The Board worked closely with the BCBS on 
Basel III.
54
 The FSB also set the conditions for discussions about the regulation of 
insurance companies.
55
 State monetary authorities, financial market regulations, and 
ministries of finance, together with international institutions such as the BCBS, the 
BIS, the IMF, and the World Bank are all part of the FSB.
56
 This means that the 
behavioural expectation of development of standards and codes started to be led by 
national authorities together with international institutions, thus bridging previous 
gaps between these two layers. This development further enhanced the bureaucratised 
nature of the GFSN regime. 
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With regards to the monitoring of implementation and information sharing and 
oversight and coordination, these two expectations were still conducted by the 
FSF/FSB, the IMF and the World Bank. However, national authorities became more 
active in these areas as well.
57
 In many countries, they had been accused of failing to 
regulate the financial sector properly. There had also been accusations that financial 
firms had little incentive to self-regulate effectively. After the GFC, this was another 
area in which the domestic and the global layers grew closer. 
 
Similar changes occurred with regards to the goals of crisis management and financial 
market strengthening. New institutions became involved in both of them. The IMF 
remained as the main liquidity provision institution at the global level, but the CMIM 
and the ESB were launched with a view to reduce future dependence on its bailout 
packages in ASEAN+3 and the Eurozone, respectively. 
 
As for financial market strengthening, regional institutions and national authorities 
became more active. At the regional level, the Asian Development Bank and 
ASEAN+3 launched the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) in 2011. 
The goal was to develop a large private sector bond market. At the domestic level, 
financial authorities in the US sought to apply tighter standards than those set by 
Basel III.
58
 In the EU, discussions about a pan-European financial transaction tax 
were launched.
59
 These are three examples among several demonstrating the extent to 
which the regional and domestic layers became more important. 
 
Table 1. Evolution of the GFSN regime 
Period Layers Main global 
institutions 
Goals Behavioural 
expectations 
1944-1971 
 
Global IMF Crisis management Liquidity provision 
acceptance by 
stressed sovereign 
1971-late 1990s Global BCBS & IMF Crisis prevention & 
crisis management 
Same as above & 
development of 
standards and codes 
Late 1990s-2008 Global, regional & 
domestic 
BCBS & IMF Crisis prevention, 
crisis management 
& financial market 
Same as above, 
monitoring of 
implementation and 
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strengthening  information sharing 
& oversight and 
coordination 
2008-present Global, regional & 
domestic 
BCBS, FSB & IMF Crisis prevention, 
crisis management 
& financial market 
strengthening 
Same as above 
 
In the next section, we will analyse in detail the ASEAN+3 regional layer. Focusing 
on the question set out above, we will examine the factors that have underpinned the 
establishment of a better defined RFSN in the region, and how these factors underpin 
complementarity between the RFSN net and the broader GFSN regime. 
 
4. ASEAN+3 as a Regional Layer of the Global Financial Safety Net 
 
Throughout the previous section we already teased out key reasons shaping the 
development of an ASEAN+3 RFSN. In this section we will expand on these reasons 
– while touching upon the politics behind the development of this particular RFSN – 
and analyse the safety net created after the EAFC in detail. Before the EAFC, the only 
RFSN in Southeast Asia was the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA), which was 
established in August 1977 when the original members of ASEAN – Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – agreed to a reciprocal currency 
swap arrangement among themselves. The idea was to provide liquidity support to 
members experiencing balance of payments difficulties. The maximum amount of 
liquidity available under the ASA was $100 million, with each member providing $20 
million. Subsequently, the maximum amount was doubled to $200 million. The size 
of the ASA was too small to be useful in helping countries manage the EAFC and so 
it was not used. 
 
Crisis prevention and management 
 
The EAFC led countries to revisit the issue of a RFSN mainly because of the way in 
which the IMF managed the crisis. Four of the crisis-affected countries – Indonesia, 
South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand – had accepted an IMF programme. The 
IMF misdiagnosed the problem and prescribed the wrong medicine – a fact that it 
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acknowledged later.
60
 It was also believed at the time that the IMF might not have 
adequate resources to help countries manage a ‘capital account’ crisis associated with 
large inflows and sudden reversals of private capital flows.
61
 Politically, it became 
necessary for the governments of the countries affected by the EAFC to develop 
mechanisms to avoid future appeal to IMF rescue packages. 
 
There were calls for establishing an Asian Monetary Fund, which did not materialise 
because of insufficient political support within the region and opposition from the 
US.
62
  Notwithstanding, there was a strong feeling among policymakers that a 
regional financing facility could act as the first line of defence by providing short-
term liquidity and thereby prevent a crisis when speculative attacks occurred.
63
 
Therefore, at their May 2000 meeting in Chiang Mai, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers 
agreed to launch the CMI as a regional “self- help and support mechanism” to provide 
“sufficient and timely financial support to ensure financial stability in the East Asia 
region” and to “supplement the existing international facilities.”64 The CMI expanded 
the ASA to all ASEAN members and set up a network of bilateral swaps among the 
ASEAN+3 countries. The ASA was subsequently expanded to $1 billion in 
November 2000 and then to $2 billion in May 2005. ASEAN+3 countries also signed 
bilateral swaps among each other and by 2008 there were 16 bilateral swaps 
amounting to $84 billion. 
 
Yet once again the RSFN in East Asia comprising the ASA and CMI bilateral swaps 
was not used when the region faced a severe credit crunch in 2008 because of the sub-
prime mortgage crisis in the US and subsequent GFC. Countries in the region (e.g., 
Singapore and South Korea) instead resorted to their bilateral swaps with the US 
Federal Reserve, which at that time acted as the international lender of last resort.
65
 
This was mainly because of the lack of conditionality to trigger the CMI swaps and 
their small sizes. Thus, East Asian countries resorted to the swap lines with the US, as 
countries in other regions did as well. Indeed, a total of 14 central banks worldwide 
would borrow nearly US$ 600 billion at the peak of the crisis, in December 2008.
66
 
 
In the post-GFC period, the case for a RFSN in East Asia has strengthened further for 
two reasons. Firstly, in an environment where economic growth in the industrial 
countries has been sub-par compared to that in emerging markets, especially those in 
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Asia, East Asian countries have sought to re-balance growth by finding markets 
within the region. Also, the slow progress in reforming the governance of the IMF has 
enhanced the case for a RFSN in East Asia to complement the IMF.
67
 This slowness 
has made East Asian countries feel that they are in a subordinate position within the 
GFSN. ASEAN+3 has, therefore, taken a number of actions to strengthen the RFSN 
in the region. These actions have created a well-developed regional layer in East Asia. 
 
Firstly, the CMI has been multilateralised into the CMIM. In March 2010, the 
bilateral swaps were combined and expanded to become the CMIM or the $120 
billion ‘self-managed reserve pool’ governed by a single contract.68 Two years later 
the size of the pool was doubled to $240 billion.
69
 As a self-managed reserve pool, the 
contributions remain in the central banks of the member countries and are not actually 
paid into a centralised reserve pool.  This underscores that a degree of mistrust in the 
region still prevents the creation of a centralised pool. 
 
Secondly, contributions, borrowing rights, and operational guidelines of the CMIM 
have been fixed. All ASEAN+3 member countries – plus Hong Kong – have 
contributed to the CMIM and are eligible to borrow from it using a multiplier – so that 
the smaller countries can borrow more – in case they face a payments problem. To 
access the CMIM, a member country must submit a request to the Coordinating 
Countries – the co-chairs of the ASEAN+3 – which then deliver the request to a non-
resident Executive Level Decision Making Body. This body then has to convene and 
take a decision based on a 2/3 majority within two weeks from the receipt of the swap 
request.
70
 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of the CMI/CMIM as part of the RFSN is complicated, 
since it is yet to be used.
71
 It could even be argued that it serves strategic rather than 
functional objectives.
72
 Nevertheless, the rapid development of the CMIM even 
though ASEAN+3 countries have suffered relatively little from the GFC suggests 
intent in making it a valid option. The CMI saw little evolution following its launch. 
In contrast, the CMIM pool is growing in size, the unlinked portion from the IMF is 
increasing (see below), and an institutional framework to support it is being built, as 
explained in the third and fourth points immediately below. 
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Thirdly, AMRO has been established and its capacity is being enhanced. With the 
multilateralisation of the CMI, there was a need for an independent surveillance unit 
to conduct due diligence so that the borrowing countries’ capacity to repay the loan 
could be assessed. In May 2011, AMRO was established as a limited company in 
Singapore. AMRO’s activities are divided into functions during so-called peace time 
and crisis time. During peace or non-crisis periods, AMRO’s main responsibility is to 
prepare quarterly consolidated reports on the overall macroeconomic assessment of 
the ASEAN+3 region as well as on individual ASEAN+3 countries.
73
 Should a crisis 
occur, however, its role and responsibilities multiply.  During crisis time, AMRO is 
tasked to (i) provide an analysis of the economic and financial situation of the CMIM 
Swap Requesting Country, (ii) monitor the use and impact of the funds disbursed 
under the CMIM agreement, and (iii) monitor the compliance by the CMIM Swap 
Requesting Country with any lending covenants to the CMIM agreement.
74
 
 
Finally, several other key decisions were taken in the May 2012 meeting of the 
ASEAN+3 finance ministers. The ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting was 
upgraded to the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. 
For the first time, the central bank governors of the 13 countries plus the head of the 
Monetary Authority of Hong Kong were invited to participate in the forum. This was 
a significant move as it brings together officials handling tax and expenditure policies 
with those handling monetary and exchange rate policies. Furthermore, a crisis 
preventive facility, the CMIM Precautionary Line, was introduced; it is similar to 
various contingent credit lines at the IMF.
75
 
 
Financial market strengthening 
 
Prior to the EAFC, borrowing in the region was largely short-term and in US$, the 
currency to which most currencies in East Asia were pegged. Short-term 
US$ borrowing was used for long-term investments in local currencies. Therefore, 
there was a maturity and currency ‘double mismatch’.76  The EAFC laid bare the 
inadequacy of this arrangement. The erosion in trust towards some currencies in the 
region and rapid capital outflows swiftly spread the crisis throughout East Asia.
77
 
From a political perspective, it became necessary for governments in the region to 
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create stronger financial markets, thus avoiding dependence on the US$ and 
preventing future crises requiring IMF-led intervention. 
 
To strengthen financial markets in the region, the August 2003 ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers Meeting agreed measures to develop local currency denominated bond 
markets – the aforementioned ABMI.78 Under this initiative, regional and government 
institutions increased the supply of local currency denominated bonds, contributing to 
the diversification and expansion of regional bond markets.
79
 The local currency 
denominated bond market grew in size from US$131 million in 1997 and US$1,099 
million in 2002 to US$6,365 million in 2012.
80
 
 
In the aftermath of the GFC, a second financial market strengthening mechanism was 
introduced. Agreed in May 2008 and launched in November 2010, the CGIF was 
created to boost long-term investment in ASEAN+3 by providing guarantees on 
corporate local currency denominated bonds. The CGIF seeks to reduce the double 
mismatch just explained.
81
 This would make financial markets in the region more 
resilient to sudden reversals of private capital flows and external shocks. The main 
beneficiaries would be corporations experiencing difficulties in tapping bond markets. 
As of 2013, ASEAN+3 countries and the Asian Development Bank had contributed 
US$700 million towards the CGIF.
82
 
 
Table 2. Evolution of the ASEAN+3 RFSN regime 
Period Scope Main institutions Goals Behavioural 
expectations 
Pre-EAFC Sub-regional ASA Crisis prevention & 
crisis management 
Liquidity provision 
acceptance by 
stressed sovereign 
Post-EAFC-2008 Regional ABMI & CMI (incl. 
ASA) 
Crisis prevention, 
crisis management 
& financial market 
strengthening  
Same as above 
2008-present Regional ABMI, AMRO, 
CGIF & CMIM 
Crisis prevention, 
crisis management 
& financial market 
strengthening 
Same as above, 
monitoring of 
implementation and 
information sharing 
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& oversight and 
coordination 
 
As a comparison of tables 1 and 2 shows, the evolution of the ASEAN+3 RFSN and 
GFSN goals has run in parallel. Meanwhile, the scope of behavioural expectations of 
East Asia’s RFSN is narrower. Development of standard and codes is not part of the 
ASEAN+3 remit, at least yet, and monitoring and implementation and oversight and 
coordination only became part of the region’s financial safety net post-GFC; that is a 
decade after they were included in the global layer. This suggests that the ASEAN+3 
RFSN complements rather than undermines the GFSN. 
 
Complementarity between the ASEAN+3 layer and the GFSN 
 
During the past several years, a number of significant steps have been taken to 
strengthen CMIM/AMRO or the RFSN in Asia. But the question is: are these steps to 
strengthen the RFSN adequate to make them a viable option that countries could 
consider and use independently from the GFSN the next time that they face a liquidity 
crisis? The answer is, probably not. This is mainly because it will take a long time for 
AMRO to build a capacity to develop and design conditionality that is independent of 
the IMF and for other ASEAN+3 initiatives to become fully autonomous too, due to 
the political mistrust already mentioned. The RFSN must, therefore, complement the 
GFSN rather than try to supplement it. 
 
In fact, as highlighted above, the May 2000 Joint Statement of the ASEAN+3 
Ministers had stipulated that the RFSN in East Asia should “supplement the existing 
international facilities.” The way this complementary is carried out in the CMI/CMIM 
is by requiring the existence of an IMF-supported programme to provide assistance in 
excess of a certain percentage of maximum access. Initially, only ten per cent of the 
maximum access was readily available, with 90 percent linked to an IMF program. 
Gradually the size of the unlinked portion has been increased. Presently, it is 30 per 
cent and is expected to be 40 per cent soon.
83
 
 
The link to the IMF was also intended to address the moral hazard problem and the 
lack of independent surveillance capacity in the CMI/CMIM. By comparing the 
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situation with RFSNs in other parts of the world, Henning has concluded that “... the 
CMI is more sensitive to preserving the central position of the IMF and not 
undercutting the IMF in negotiations with borrowing countries than these other 
arrangements.”84 
 
Certainly, increasing the unlinked portion of the CMIM maximum access to 40 per 
cent suggests that the link with the IMF is becoming more tenuous. However, and in 
spite of the poor image that the IMF enjoys in East Asia, mistrust among countries in 
the region helps to explain why, from a political viewpoint, it is still unfeasible to 
develop a truly independent RFSN. Most notably, Sino-Japanese rivalry enhances the 
possibility of the IMF link remaining.
85
 Furthermore, the IMF has been willing to take 
a cooperative stance in areas such as capacity building and information sharing with 
AMRO, which is still developing its capabilities. Most notably, the first AMRO-IMF 
joint seminar was held in January 2014.
86
 This suggests that the IMF has decided to 
engage with the ASEAN+3 RFSN rather than to treat it as a competitor. This is a wise 
decision from a political perspective, given that East Asian countries are still 
underrepresented in the IMF in terms of voting share. 
 
Furthermore, the decisions taken at the March 2010 and May 2012 meetings of the 
ASEAN+3 finance ministers have made the CMIM a stronger regional financial 
safety net. However, although the CMIM’s size has increased significantly to $240 
billion, it is unlikely to be sufficient, on a standalone basis, if there were to be a full 
blown systemic crisis in the region. During the EAFC, Thailand received over $17 
billion in emergency liquidity. Yet, Thailand – and other original ASEAN members – 
can access only a fraction of the amount, about $7 billion from the CMIM without an 
IMF programme. Indonesia received almost six times ($40 billion) of what its 
unlinked portion of the CMIM can provide.
87
 
 
For the CMIM to be an effective RFSN, either the size of the crisis fund or the 
percentage of unlinked portion needs to be increased substantially.
88
 These can 
happen only gradually and over a period of time. Hence, an alternative way to 
promote complementarity between CMIM and IMF through a more structured 
approach of CMIM/AMRO/IMF cooperation such as in the ‘troika’ model being used 
by the EU is under consideration.
89
 In the EU, bailout packages are jointly designed, 
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financed, and monitored by the European Central Bank, the European Commission, 
and the IMF.
90
 Such joint activities could go a long way in further promoting 
complementarity between the RFSN in East Asia and the IMF. Presently, 
collaboration between AMRO and the IMF is for the most part informal, with the IMF 
providing technical inputs to AMRO’s surveillance activities. 
 
Similarly, there are links between the RFSN and the BIS/BCBS. The EAFC crisis 
highlighted the problems of inadequate bank governance and regulation in East Asia. 
This led to an overhaul of banks and to recognition of the need for developing local 
currency bond markets. Thus, two initiatives that are on-going at the regional level are 
(i) the creation of the pan-Asian Asian Bond Funds (ABF) under the auspices of 
EMEAP, and (ii) the ABMI of the ASEAN+3. The former focuses on boosting the 
demand for local currency bonds, while the latter seeks to enhance the supply of such 
bonds. While the ABMI is managed by ASEAN+3, the ABF is managed by the BIS. 
This entrenches the relationship between the BIS and the RFSN, even if through a 
pan-Asian institution. The relationship between the BIS/BCBS has been further 
strengthened by the fact that more East Asian central banks joined the BIS
91
 and the 
BCBS
92
 following the GFC. 
 
In addition, and similarly to the case of the IMF, the BIS does not seem to treat 
ASEAN+3 as a competitor. Indeed, ASEAN+3 countries have encouraged AMRO to 
engage with the BIS in order to bolster its institutional capacity.
93
 As already 
observed, several East Asian countries have gained membership of the BIS – and the 
BCBS – following the GFC. Thus, it could be argued that the subordinate role of East 
Asian countries within these institutions is less clear, at least from a political point of 
view. This would make ASEAN+3 countries more willing to engage with the 
BIS/BCBS. 
 
Also, the BCBS engaged with ASEAN+3 countries when developing Basel III. The 
2004 Basel II was the result of an agreement between the US and the EU.
94
 This 
underscored the subordinate role of non-Western countries in the GFSN. Differently, 
negotiations leading to Basel III involved East Asian countries,
95
 among others. As a 
result, countries in the region would feel more comfortable with the RFSN that they 
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have developed complementing rather than replacing a GFSN to which they have 
contributed. 
 
Differently, links between the RFSN and the FSB are non-existent. However, this is 
the result of an institutional vacuum in East Asia rather than disagreement between 
the FSB and a regional equivalent. At present, at the ASEAN+3 level, there is no 
forum where bank regulators are involved. Calls have, however, been made to 
establish an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (AFSD) to promote regional financial 
stability which would involve finance ministers, central bank governors, and bank 
regulators and supervisors. The objectives of the AFSD would be to (i) monitor 
factors affecting regional financial stability, including national financial market 
conditions and capital flows, and (ii) design appropriate policy actions.
96
 The idea is 
that this institution would operate like a regional FSB in Asia. When established, it 
could be linked to the FSB. This would further reinforce the complementary role of 
the ASEAN+3 RFSN. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The proliferation of RFSNs does not spell the end of the GFSN. As this article has 
shown, RFSNs can complement the GFSN. The case of the ASEAN+3 regional net 
clearly illustrates this point. Considering that the IMF’s handling of the EAFC was 
heavily criticised in East Asia, the fact that countries in this region henceforth 
developed a complementary rather than competing safety net is a positive sign for the 
GFSN. Indeed, the Eurozone’s response to its own sovereign debt crisis suggests that 
RFSNs elsewhere are also complementary to the global net. 
 
As Haggard and Simmons explain, regimes evolve when they become 
dysfunctional.
97
 The evolution of the GFSN regime is a case in point. From the late 
1990s onwards, the global layer was supplemented by regional and domestic layers 
and new goals and behavioural expectations appeared. This is the context in which 
East Asia’s and other RFSNs first originated. In the same way that the trade or 
environmental regimes have evolved and adapted to their changing circumstances,
98
 
the financial safety regime has shown flexibility to accommodate new layers. 
Evolution and adaptation underpin the complementarity between the RFSN and the 
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GFSN and help to allow the latter overcome the dysfunctionality it has been accused 
of due to the GFC. 
 
Meanwhile, the ASEAN+3 RFSN is modelled on the GFSN. The issue around which 
it has been created (i.e., financial stability) and its goals and behavioural expectations 
– as laid out in table 2 – are indistinguishable from those of the global net. As 
explained in section 2, these are the three essential characteristics of all international 
regimes. Sharing the characteristics of the GFSN further compounds the 
complementary nature of the ASEAN+3 RFSN. It is likely that other RFSNs also 
share these characteristics. 
 
Our research is not without shortcomings. Most notably, it would be interesting to 
study other RFSNs and their relationship with the GFSN. It would also be worth 
analysing in depth the role of domestic safety nets in a multilayered global financial 
governance regime. Nevertheless, this article shows how different crises and the 
limitations of previous versions of the GFSN have led to the evolution of this safety 
net. Most notably, RFSNs are being created to complement a decades-old GFSN and 
together strengthen multilateral financial governance. 
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